Introduction

In a philosophical dialog written by Plato around 400 B.C., casual acquaintances Socrates and Euthyphro meet by chance on the court-house steps. Euthyphro proudly announces that he has come to accuse his own father of manslaughter. Under Greek law, such a charge is considered improper, but Euthyphro intends to press his case anyway. He is confident that very few people understand what’s right and what’s wrong as clearly as he does. Furthermore, he is certain that the gods themselves agree with him.

Socrates cannot let such claims unchallenged. He pretends to be clueless about the whole topic, and implores Euthyphro to enlighten him. And about halfway through their conversation, Socrates asks him (Woods and Pack translation):

Is the pious loved by the gods because it’s pious, or it is pious because it is loved?

People have been discussing this question for 2,400 years. The weird thing about it is that when you think through them, neither of the choices it offers us makes a bit of sense. Let’s take a look. We’ll put the question into modern English, and look at its two halves in turn.

The two non-options

If someone tells us that, according to their religious beliefs, a certain activity – prayer, for example – is good, we can ask:

Is it good because God wants us to do it, or does God want us to do it because it’s good?

The first option – prayer is good because God likes it – implies that there are no external rules governing God’s judgement of right and wrong. If there were such rules, we would be talking about the second option, where God approves of good things because they’re good. In this, the first option, an action is good if and only if God approves.

It’s a troubling scenario. Take the rule, “Do unto others as you would be done by,” which most people regard as morally faultless. If God has perfect freedom to decide what’s right, then he could say that he does not want us to follow the Golden Rule, and that would mean that it is evil, and those who have occasionally tried to honor it would be morally obligated to desist. And if one day God said, “On the Sabbath day, I’d like to see a bit of torture and cannibalism in every living-room,” then torture and cannibalism would be right.

But if scenarios like this are possible, then God is speaking a language we can’t understand. We don’t know what it would mean to say that the Golden Rule is ‘evil’, or torture and cannibalism ‘right’. If God can have opinions like this, how can we even say with any confidence that God is good? We don’t know what the word means anymore. But, traditionally, God is the source and epitome of goodness. If we can’t be sure that he’s good, then we can’t be sure he’s God! So this first option can’t be correct.

The second option says: it’s not that praying is good because God likes it; rather, he wants us to do it because it’s good. This implies that there is a moral authority superior to, prior to, independent of God’s. What’s right and wrong was decided before God got involved. So there are rules that God has to follow, laws that he cannot break. But we’ve been told that God created the entire universe to his own specifications, and that there is nothing he can’t do. Seriously, if he’s not omnipotent, then he’s not God. So the second option is also wrong.

What’s going on here? Whichever way we answer, we reach an absurd conclusion: that the God we’ve been talking about is not the God we’ve been talking about. How does Plato’s question produce this result? – and what can we learn from the fact that it does?

The lesson

The Euthyphro’s topic is the relationship between religion and morality; about the fundamental source and justification of moral guidelines. Socrates says, in effect, “I take your word for it, Euthyphro, that God is intimately connected with what’s right and wrong. I just want to understand how that works in a little more detail. Is the action good because God wants it to be taken, or does he want it to be taken because it is good?”

Behind this question there are two assumptions about God. The catch is, they contradict each other. They cannot both be true.

To ask about what God wants (or likes, or prefers) is to assume that God prefers certain things (or events) over others. And in the background, as part of any mention of God, there is a definitional assumption that God is omnipotent. But these two assumptions are mutually exclusive, since an omnipotent being would not have desires.

For human beings, to want is the same thing as to get, if possible. If you desire something, you make it happen – if you can. But God, by definition, can do anything. So if he wants it, it happens. Period. But in that case, he doesn’t want things the way we do – not in the sense of trying to get something. An omnipotent being doesn’t try. Everything already is the way he wants it.

Someone will say: Maybe God doesn’t make all the things he wants to happen, happen. But he could – and if he doesn’t, then it’s not clear what it means to say that he wants them.

It gets worse. If everything that happens is exactly as God intends, then the question “What should I do?” has no meaning. What’s going to happen is what’s going to happen. There are no right or wrong choices, because no one ever gets to choose. But choice – “What should I do?” – is the very essence of morality. If an omnipotent being controls the universe, then our moral decision-making is an illusion, and our moral discussions are a waste of time, because there’s nothing we can decide or change.

All these strange, impotent thoughts have a single cause. The concept of omnipotence is incoherent. As soon as you say that he can do anything, you invite ridiculous questions like “Can God beat a full house with two pair?” and “Can God make a burrito so big he can’t eat it?” You have dug a pit of nonsense, and further discussion will only deepen the hole. This is why neither horn of the Euthyphro dilemma gets us anywhere; and this is what it was written to demonstrate. Propositions involving omnipotent beings are guaranteed not to make any sense.

More broadly, Plato’s ancient teaching-story serves to remind us that morality is essentially and exclusively a human concern. To introduce infinities and absolutes into moral thinking is to strip it of sense. Stories about superhuman beings cannot clarify what’s right or wrong for human beings to do, or explain why it’s right or wrong. There is no useful role, in either moral theory or moral decision-making, for theology.

Is this a reasonable way to treat your customers?

This happens all the time. I put a DVD into my player, and the first thing I see is an ugly threat. 5 YEARS IN FEDERAL PRISON, it bellows at me. It’s hard to imagine a ruder way to treat the customer who’s chosen to watch your movie. Who on Earth came up with this? And how do we make them stop?

Today I was watching Where the Wild Things Are, which is from Warner Brothers; but all the big studios do something similar. Before the title, before anything, the very first thing, they’re yelling abusive language in your face – and they program the disc to disable all your controls, so they can yell at you as long as they want to. Some discs keep the controls disabled through a whole string of previews, which is kind of like what they did to that poor guy in A Clockwork Orange.

Sorry, chapter selection is temporarily disabled!

DVDs shouldn’t even have previews. They should not have any kind of advertising or marketing, especially before you even get to see the top menu. I feel like a chump when that happens. I craved this movie and paid $20 for it, and now before I get to see it you’re going to take away the controls and show me a bunch of ads, whether I want to see them or not! Should I have seen that coming? Should I have known that Warner Brothers was planning to treat me like dirt?

Well, I know now. So I won’t be buying DVDs from WB any more. I’ll be hesitant even to rent them. Paying to be insulted is not my idea of a good time.

Some weeks ago I was at a meeting of Sacramento Freethinkers Atheists and Non-Believers and someone said, “Why are religious organizations better at charity than secular organizations? And shouldn’t we try to pick up the slack? What can we at SacFAN do to promote ‘good works’?”

This remark bothered me for days, so much that I was forced to do the research and analysis necessary to determine whether there was any truth to it. There wasn’t. The truth is, religious organizations are not better at charity than secular ones.

In the first half of this report I showed that the widely cited statistics that seem to show that Christians give much more to charity than atheists do are fatally flawed, and do not mean what religious apologists want them to mean. Despite the claims, there is no evidence for this special generosity that is supposed to emanate from the Christian faith. This second half will show that the good works produced by secular institutions are astonishing in their scale. Religious contributions are trivial in comparison.

International, secular, charitable organizations

The first point that needs to be made is pretty obvious. If you don’t think that there are secular organizations out there doing beautiful things, let me remind you of a few examples.

UNICEF provides children in over 150 countries with health care, clean water, nutrition, education, emergency relief, and more. ($3 billion in 2008)

Oxfam works in nearly 100 countries to overcome poverty and injustice. ($772 million in FY 2008–09)

CARE, a humanitarian organization fighting global poverty, puts special focus on working alongside poor women because, equipped with the proper resources, women have the power to help whole families and entire communities escape poverty. CARE also delivers emergency aid to survivors of war and natural disasters. ($700 million in FY 2008–09)

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement promotes humanitarian principles and values; provides disaster response; teaches disaster preparedness; promotes health and provides care. ($450 million in 2009 – and this does not include their 186 national societies)

Save the Children Federation works to ensure that children in need grow up protected and safe, educated, healthy and well-nourished, and able to thrive in economically secure households. ($400 million in 2009)

The International Rescue Committee responds to the world’s worst humanitarian crises and helps people to survive and rebuild their lives. ($240 million in FY 2009)

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières is an international medical humanitarian organization working in more than 60 countries to assist people whose survival is threatened by violence, neglect, or catastrophe. ($168 million in 2008)

I adapted these descriptions from the organizations’ About Us pages. The dollar amounts are the annual program expenditures cited in their annual report – this is the amount that was spent on helping people, not organizational overhead. Compare these numbers with any religion.

But please remember to compare apples to apples. When it comes to the delivery of charitable services, a strongly religious organization necessarily embodies certain inefficiencies as compared to a secular one. For example, religious observances cost money, and those costs will have to be deducted from the charitable effort. More silver chalices, more ceremonial wine and wafers, more statues of Jesus means less medicine or food or whatever the charity was supposed to be about. Promulgation, too, siphons away resources from humanitarian projects. More priests on the plane to spread the Good News around means fewer doctors on the plane to treat malaria or tuberculosis or AIDS.

Evangelism is routinely considered part of the mission. When churches list their charitable efforts, I would bet you a million dollars that most of them include “spreading the Good News” on that list. But it is not charity, it is marketing.

When you donate to (or volunteer for) a church, the primary beneficiaries are the church and the people who run the church. This does not help children in Africa. It does not even help children in the church’s own neighborhood. You must keep these considerations in mind when comparing charitable work by religious organizations to charitable work by secular organizations.

Social welfare programs in the secular democracies

There are secular institutions bigger than UNICEF. Much bigger. They’re called countries.

Of course everything such entities do is not benevolent, but if you want to talk about good works, the world’s secular democracies perform charity on a fantastic scale. Think of all the taxpayer-funded social-welfare programs in these countries. Year after year, all over the world, citizens who are doing well enough that they have to pay taxes contribute trillions of dollars to their less-fortunate neighbors, no matter what anyone’s declared faith may be on either end of the transaction.

Here are some of the things we do here in the United States in a single fiscal year. (The following text is adapted from FY 2010 information at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities.)

Social Security provides retirement benefits to retired workers (36 million of them, as of December 2009) and their eligible dependents. It also provides survivors’ and disability benefits. ($708 billion)

Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP provide health care or long-term care to low-income children, parents, elderly people, and people with disabilities. ($753 billion for all three programs)

Safety net programs ($482 billion) provide aid (other than health insurance or Social Security benefits) to individuals and families facing hardship. In 2005, according to CBPP analysis, such programs kept approximately 15 million Americans out of poverty, and reduced the depth of poverty for another 29 million. The programs include:

  • earned-income and child tax credits, which assist low- and moderate-income working families
  • cash payments to eligible individuals or households, including Supplemental Security Income for the elderly or disabled poor and unemployment insurance
  • in-kind assistance for low-income families and individuals, including food stamps, school meals, low-income housing assistance, child-care assistance, and assistance in meeting home energy bills
  • other programs such as those that aid abused and neglected children.

If you even think about comparing these numbers to the efforts of any religion, or all religions together, you are going to feel kind of ashamed.

Someone will say, “But every taxpayer pays for these programs, the religious as well as the non-believers.”

Yes, but the point is that the whole arrangement is a result of secular thinking. The question in front of us right now has to do with the differences between religious and secular institutions. Is the organization responsible for the enormous expenditures on social welfare listed above a religious one, or is it secular? The government of the United States of America is almost perfectly non-religious. It was designed by secular humanists. It is the reification of a humanitarian social contract with no theological component. Religion had no role in the Constitution or the New Deal. None of our laws or institutions are based on the Christian Bible or any other “holy” book. And of course the social safety net has been relentlessly opposed by all major religions. There are people who claim that compassion is essentially a religious impulse, but this is upside-down and backwards. Around the world and across history, the societies that have provided such humanitarian structures for their citizens have all been secular. In fact it never happened until quite recently – when religion began to lose its hold on our imaginations. Religion makes democracy impossible.

Someone will say, “Your secular democracies, especially the United States, do terrible things – making war on innocent people, for example – as well as good.”

Yes, but so do religious organizations. So that doesn’t get us anywhere. On the other hand, democracy is a humanitarian idea in its very essence. The only reason democracy exists is that it’s supposed to help everyone have a better life. You can’t say the same thing about religion. The purpose of religion is not to give people a better life, unless you mean after they’re dead.

Look through the holy books of the Big Monotheisms. There’s hardly a mention of how to have a decent life, or how to provide a decent life for others. The topic simply doesn’t come up.

The Q’uran’s primary message seems to be, “If you don’t believe this book, you’re going to Hell.” It’s all about pleasing Allah – which really means pleasing the author of the book and the head of the church, a guy called Muhammad. I don’t call that a good life. I don’t call that equality, or respect, or kindness. The Christian Old Testament – its first five books are also known as the Jewish Torah – glorifies and abjectly worships a creator-god who has no interest whatever in the welfare of human beings. The God of Moses and Abraham (and Muhammad) wipes out cities, tribes, and whole ecosystems when he’s in one of his moods. Obviously, compassion’s got nothing to do with it.

In the New Testament we do see an occasional glimmer of kindness, but it is rare. And Jesus never mentions justice (in the modern sense of fairness, as opposed to the older sense of retribution). Nor does he ever once use the word ‘democracy’. The authors of the holy scriptures seem to have been just fine with the prevailing social structure of that ancient era: absolute tyranny, with a man on the throne who can be as vainglorious, capricious and bloodthirsty as he likes. That is what Moses and Muhammad and all the other “prophets” advocated. There is not a single sentence in any of these books on how to set up a just society – one where everyone counts and everyone matters. But this is the entire object of the foundational documents of secular democracy.

Little wonder, then, that secular institutions provide so much more kindness to those who need it than religious institutions do.

Introduction

Proponents of religion, and especially of Christianity, insist that religion is essentially a good thing. It makes the world a better place, because it’s all about being good to people. For example, Karen Armstrong’s Charter for Compassion begins:

The principle of compassion lies at the heart of all religious, ethical and spiritual traditions, calling us always to treat all others as we wish to be treated ourselves. Compassion impels us to work tirelessly to alleviate the suffering of our fellow creatures, to dethrone ourselves from the centre of our world and put another there, and to honour the inviolable sanctity of every single human being, treating everybody, without exception, with absolute justice, equity and respect.

That’s a pretty paragraph – but the word ‘religious’ does not belong at the front of it. No religion has ever offered, or tried to offer, “justice, equity and respect” to “every single human being.” That is pure fantasy. To mention just one example out of millions, the Christian and Islamic scriptures require that women be given less respect than men. It’s right there in black and white. Apologists like Armstrong have been telling us since Day One that religion is a force for good – that it is the epitome of good – but this is simply and obviously and utterly false.

Armstrong’s proposal has a sinister side, because if you accept her version of “compassion” then you cannot accept secularism. If it were true that religion makes us better people, then to support secularism would be to push for a harsher, less compassionate world. But of course religion does not make us better people. This is a lie; yet it has been shouted so loudly, and repeated so faithfully, for so many centuries, that almost everyone believes it. Even many atheists do.

In a piece called 10 Things That Christians Are Better At Than Atheists, “Friendly Atheist” Hemant Mehta writes:

Christians give back to the community they love. It’s a part of their budget. Many atheists might pay their organizations’ membership dues, but they do very little else to support them.

Parenting Beyond Belief author Dale McGowan agrees:

When it comes to actual giving of actual money, there’s no contest: churchgoers have us licked. Even outside of church-based giving, the average churchgoer in the U.S. gives twice as much as the average non-churchgoing American. Obviously there will be notable exceptions … but the overall picture of giving by secular individuals needs improvement.

Keith Logan of Young Australian Skeptics asks, “Why do religious groups have a monopoly over charity?

And a recent post on the Atheist Revolution blog makes the same mistake:

Foundation Beyond Belief is an organization designed to make it easier for people to support charities that do not proselytize. … Think of it sort of like a secular version of tithing. … Foundation Beyond Belief … helps to combat the stereotype that atheists do not support charities. Sure, one could contribute directly to any of the selected charitable organizations as an individual, but there is something to be said for larger donations coming from a secular group.

So even folks who are pretty comfortable with atheism are saying: “Look at all the religious groups doing ‘good works’. Why don’t secularists give back to the community they love (as Hemant Mehta puts it), the way religious folks do?”

But this is all upside-down. Religion doesn’t make you a better person, and religious people and institutions do not make the world a better place. In this post I will show that the statistical studies that supposedly demonstrate that religion has a positive influence in charitable giving do not hold up when examined carefully and without prejudice. Next time, I will show that secular people and institutions contribute enormously to the general welfare – probably much more than religious ones do.

Why the studies are misleading

Aren’t there scientific studies that show more charitable giving by Christians than by atheists? Only if the misleading interpretation of data from ideologically biased opinion polls qualifies as scientific study.

Mehta and McGowan cite studies by the Barna Group (see for example Trends in Tithing and Donating). The first thing to note about Barna is that they are evangelists. This does not immediately invalidate everything they say, but it should make us suspicious of their methodology, their results, and their reporting. Too strong, you say? Remember that an evangelist is basically a liar. If you haven’t read me before, that may sound pretty extreme, but it’s a simple fact. Evangelism is lying for a living. Helping churches prosper is central to Barna’s stated mission – and you can’t do that without lying.

In 2008, Barna’s president David Kinnaman described some of their study results this way: “Many of the most ardent critics of Christianity claim that compassion and generosity do not hinge on faith; yet those who divorce themselves from spiritual commitment are significantly less likely to help others.” In Kinnaman’s description, atheists are bad people by definition – no wonder they give so little to charity!

A set of Gallup polls, “Giving and Volunteering 1989–95″, is cited in Religion as social capital: producing the common good, edited by Corwin E. Smidt. I am going to quote from this book’s discussion of the Gallup data, and show how the authors are misinterpreting it. The passages are from Chapter 6, “Religion and Volunteering in America” by David E. Campbell and Steven J. Yonish, and Chapter 7, “The Religious Basis of Charitable Giving in America” by Roger J. Nemeth and Donald A. Luidens.

Campbell and Yonish say that according to the survey:

Americans volunteer more for religious organizations than any other type of group. This mirrors the finding of Nemeth and Luidens in the next chapter that Americans give more money to religious causes than any other type of charity. (p. 90)

First question: Why is a “religious cause” automatically considered a charity? Isn’t it misleading to give money to your church and call that “giving to charity”? I mean, think about where the money goes. You’re paying for your preacher’s salary, and the beautification of his workplace – what kind of charity is that?

The authors seem to be conflating the idea of a not-for-profit organization, contributions to which are tax-deductible, with the idea of a charity, contributions to which will actually help people who actually need it. Churches are statutorily not for profit, but that doesn’t mean that they do anybody any good. To me the word ‘charity’ means we’re talking about the more fortunate helping the less fortunate. But little, if any, of the money you give to your church goes toward helping people in need. It mostly goes toward the church: the land, the buildings, the stained glass, the silver chalices, the silk chasubles, the pastors’ salaries and offices and residences. None of this actually benefits anyone except the pastors – the professionals – the guys who set up this whole operation and registered it as a tax-exempt charity.

So look at the language again. “Americans volunteer more for religious organizations than any other type of group [and] give more money to religious causes than any other type of charity.” Campbell and Yonish take all the time and money that church-goers devote to their church and call it charity. I don’t think that’s the right word for it.

Church involvement provides a powerful impetus for individuals to engage in voluntary activity. But, if we look at volunteering from a slightly different angle, it also serves to channel volunteers into internal church-maintenance activity at the expense of more general-purpose volunteering. Among people who volunteer … more frequent church attendance leads to a lower probability of engaging in secular, informal, or advocacy volunteer activities. (p. 100–101)

People who go to church a lot volunteer a lot – but only for the church. They’re too busy to do “general-purpose” volunteering. Church participation makes them less generous with their time, not more. And what kind of work is it that they are volunteering for?

In 1995, 82 percent of religious volunteers indicated that the work they did for their religious organization was … internal church maintenance activities. Such a high percentage suggests that there is a distinction to be made between nonreligious and religious volunteering. (p. 102)

Indeed there is. Internal church maintenance! – this is not feeding the hungry or sheltering the homeless. It’s not humanitarianism. It’s not generous, it’s inward-facing. It benefits, not people in need, but the church itself. The organization. The priests.

These results suggest that the form social capital takes within a church community does not have appreciably different effects from that found within secular voluntary associations, at least in regards to voluntarism. This is similar to Nemeth and Luiden’s conclusion in Chapter 7 that people who participate at least weekly in either religious or nonreligious organizations contribute equally to charity. (p. 105)

So, according to Campbell and Yonish, participation in religious organizations builds “social capital” in the form of relationships, norms, and habits; and participation in other kinds of organizations – the League of Women Voters, or a bowling league – has the same effect. Religious organizations are not actually better at this than other kinds of organizations.

We now move on to Nemeth and Luidens in chapter 7.

Although a forceful and cogent argument can be made that religion creates social capital in the form of charitable giving, it is a bit more difficult to generate an empirical verification of such a causal relationship. (p. 110)

This is hand-waving. They believe that religion is a positive influence, but they can’t demonstrate it. “Forceful and cogent” arguments can also be made that religion poisons everything it touches.

What the Gallup data show is that participation in social organizations of any kind has a positive influence. If these data mean that religion creates social capital, they also mean that bowling creates social capital. Nemeth and Luidens do not highlight this.

More people participate in religion than in bowling, but that doesn’t make religion more effective, only more popular. (Furthermore, religious participation is inflated by coercion. Millions of people go to religious services partly or only because if they don’t go someone will kill them. This is not true of bowling.) But Nemeth and Luidens really want to find something special about religion.

By varying the presence or levels of other variables (e.g. income), we hope to find whether religious membership influences giving in any discernable way, and if it does, whether the patterns can be explained in terms of relationships that are likely to be found exclusively among religious members. (p. 110)

Why would we expect that? What kind of relationship happens “exclusively among religious members”? (The obvious answer is pederasty – but that happens in the secular world too.) The passage reveals a huge assumption that underlies the whole book – and countless others. The authors want to verify, somehow, that religion is a qualitatively different type of enterprise. But there is no evidence to support this. It is simply assumed. And of course this makes the argument almost circular. Define churches as charitable organizations and you are halfway there.

In 1995, about one-half of all respondents reported making a contribution to religious organizations. This was nearly double the figure for health-related charities, which ranked second in terms of the number of contributions made. Moreover, the average amount contributed to religious organizations far exceeded the average given to any other charity. … In fact, the average amount contributed to religion is nearly double the level of giving to all other charities combined ($417 compared to $279)! (p. 111)

Remarkable – until you remember what religious organizations do with all that money. Nemeth and Luidens assume that religion is a good thing – that by contributing to a religious organization you enable it to do good things. But churches don’t do only good things. Many of the things they do are neutral, or bad.

Spending $417 a year on your church does not make you generous. And it certainly does not mean that you have a habit of taking effective humanitarian action. It only means that belonging to a church is more expensive than belonging to a bowling league.

Religious members are (by a margin of 20–25 percent) more likely to contribute to charities than are non-members … . … But what about charities that are specifically nonreligious in nature? … Religious members are not only more likely than non-members to contribute to nonreligious organizations, but they are more likely to contribute in greater amounts. (p. 111–112)

This is almost interesting. But remember three things.

a. Very few organizations are “specifically nonreligious”. They’re not opposed to religion, they just don’t emphasize it. When Nemeth and Luidens write “nonreligious” charities they just mean all charities, including the specifically religious ones. Note that in general, people who want to, say, feed the hungry don’t found a church. Instead they’ll start an organization dedicated to feeding the hungry. So in general, contributing to a church is going to be a less effective way of helping people. There are organizations set up specifically to help people; churches exist for other reasons.

b. On the other hand, since religion has a (false) reputation for doing good things, it tends to attract people who want to do good things. Someone might form (or join) a church because they have been told that this is the best way to feed the hungry. But such people are not generous because they’re in church, they’re in church because they’re generous (and because they have been misled). When church members do good works, it’s because they are generous, not because they are religious. They joined the church because the church said, “we are a great place for generous people.” But there are much better places for generous people than a church.

c. It’s well established that people don’t go to church nearly as often as they say they do. About half of these “at least weekly” churchgoers are liars. Might they also be exaggerating their levels of charitable contribution? This would severely compromise the Gallup data!

If religion’s influence on charitable giving results from relationships embedded in religious organizations (as the social capital model would suggest), then one would expect that those members who participate more in the life of their church or synagogue will be more strongly influenced by these relationships. In other words, we would expect greater religious participation to be associated with greater support of charities. … Roughly two-thirds of those who attend church on a weekly basis make contributions to nonreligious charities; in contrast, only 57 percent of those attending church less than one or two times a month do so. But this is exactly what one might expect with regard to social capital – the norms and expectations of a group are likely to be strongest among those who interact frequently and on a regular basis. (p. 113)

Now this is a strange one. As we saw earlier, the Gallup data provide no evidence that religious organizations promote benevolence to a greater degree than other kinds of organizations. Nemeth and Luidens could have written this:

If religion’s influence on charitable giving results from relationships embedded in any kind of organization … , then one would expect that those members who participate more in the life of their organization of whatever kind (especially if it describes itself as benevolent) will be more strongly influenced by these relationships. In other words, we would expect greater participation in almost any organization to be associated with greater support of charities.

But Nemeth and Luidens miss this. They are blinded by their assumption that there is something magical about specifically religious institutions.

Weekly participation in either religious or nonreligious organizations substantially increased the likelihood of giving to charities. Indeed, weekly participants in either religious or nonreligious organizations contribute to charities in nearly the same proportions. … However, weekly participants in religion gave nearly twice as much of their income to charities as did weekly participants in nonreligious organizations. (p. 118)

This is the bottom line, and the description is misleading. To see why, you have to look at the chart (Table 7.5, page 117).

This table compares the charitable contributions of four types of people. The type 2 person participates at least weekly in some non-religious organization. Type 3ers participate at least weekly in a religious organization. Type 4 folks do both; Type 1, neither.

The middle four lines deal with contributions to “all charities.” Frequent participants in religious organizations (orange oval) contributed more of their household income than did those in nonreligious organizations (green) – 2.3% compared to 1.3%. But “all charities” includes religious institutions, which usually means that your contributions support the church rather than people who need help.

The last four lines are about contributions to “nonreligious” charities – that is, the ones that actually are charities. Frequent participants in nonreligious organizations (blue) contributed more of their household income to nonreligious charities than those in religious organizations (red) – 0.9% compared to 0.5%. People who did both (purple) spent the same amount; that is, church attendance didn’t increase it.

Contrary to the authors’ description, the Gallup data do not show a positive correlation between participation in a religious organization and charitable contributions to the general welfare. Even if they did, this could be explained by the phenomenon mentioned earlier: the practically universal belief that a church is a good place to do humanitarian things seems likely to lead to generous people joining churches! But the Gallup data do not support this, either.

Bottom line: it has not been convincingly shown that religious people are statistically much more likely to support those less fortunate than themselves with charitable contributions of time or money.

In Part 2 of this piece I will show that secular institutions do in fact accomplish this. They don’t just talk about it. They actually help people who need help. A lot of people. Every day.

Zinnia Jones says:

Atheism is not a kind of theistic belief, because it does not involve belief in any deities. It’s actually the absence of such beliefs. Similarly, atheism is not a position based on faith. Instead, it is a lack of faith. We don’t have faith that there are no gods, we just have no faith that there are any gods. Simply not believing in gods does not involve any kind of faith, because it does not require taking a position that is unsupported by evidence or contradicted by evidence. We just find the reasons given for belief in gods insufficient and unconvincing. Faith is not necessary in order to not believe in something that there is no reason to believe in.

I like this post from Atheist Revolution. You cannot have a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, because Jesus Christ is not a person. End of story.

I had an interesting exchange with Kel Munger a couple weeks ago at her delightful talk for SacFAN.

Her topic was “The United States of Armageddon”: our native infatuation with apocalyptic theories and literature, which is kind of like end-of-the-world pornography. Why do we have this? — what is its scriptural basis? — can we get rid of it? — Munger was addressing questions like these.

William Miller, 1782 – 1849

In the Q&A following her presentation, someone asked about the astonishing process whereby cults recover from that awkward situation where their elders have promised a Second Coming and nobody comes. The classic example is the Great Disappointment of the Millerites, on October 22, 1844. Jesus did not appear, yet not all the Millerites lost their faith. “Since apocalypse is to be longed for,” Munger had said, “disconfirmation does not discredit the doctrine.” William Miller’s career did not end. Many people continued to take him seriously; some of them went on to found Seventh-Day Adventism.

So someone in the audience came back to this and asked: how can this be? How can an event like the Great Disappointment not immediately terminate the career of the cad who instigated it?

Munger said (I am quoting from memory): “Well, in fiction, it’s called the willing suspension of disbelief. People like stories. They like story-tellers. They want to believe.”

I put my hand up and made eye contact. “Suspension of disbelief sounds like a fair description if we’re talking about the folks in the congregation. But if we look at the professional Bible-thumper who who led them into this mess, wouldn’t lying through one’s teeth be more accurate? It seems to me that ‘the doctrine is not discredited’ only because someone’s income depends on it.”

She blanched. “I don’t think that’s fair,” she said. “Most preachers are not liars. You can’t tar all of them with the same brush. Most of them are not evil men. They are trying to do the right thing for their community, according to their best understanding.”

Caught off-guard by this likable woman’s evident distress, I backed down. “OK, separate topic,” I said. “Some other evening.” But later in the Q&A someone else revived the issue, and Munger said a little more.

“I do agree with Roy,” she said, “when it comes to people like Billy Graham and Rick Warren. The Left Behind guys. The mega-church people. I can agree that those people don’t believe in anything but making money — that they literally worship Mammon. But picture a much more common scenario: the well-meaning pastor and his 50 congregants in a storefront church in, say, rural Idaho. As I mentioned, that was my whole environment growing up. I know how it works. This is not a guy whose whole program is to rip people off. He believes in what he’s doing. He’s trying to do right.”

I shook my head. “That’s very hard for me to imagine,” I said. “His job is to tell the congregation things that are not true. He makes his living by telling lies. How is that ‘trying to do right’?”

Kel said, “Lying is when you say what you think is not true. That’s not what preachers do. They say what they think is true. You might call it delusional, and you might be right, but that still doesn’t make him a liar.

When I got home I expressed my frustration to Vicky; but she agreed with Munger. “If they believe what they’re saying, then it’s simply not correct to call them liars,” she said. “The word doesn’t mean that.”

“But I’ve written a whole book demonstrating that they don’t actually believe anything they’re preaching.”

“But people are not familiar with that thesis.”

“No, and I didn’t bring it up.”

“So you shouldn’t have expected people to know what you meant when you described priests are liars. They thought you were talking nonsense, and they were not completely wrong.”

“So what can I say? What is the preacher in Idaho doing? If ‘lying’ is the wrong word, what should I call it?”

“I don’t know, Roy. There doesn’t have to be a one-word solution.”

~ • ~

That conversation took place a couple weeks ago, and I’m still mulling it over.

Priests (preachers, imams, rabbis — anyone who tells people what to do and claims that it’s based on their religious understanding) aren’t liars, because they happen to believe what they’re saying. They might be mistaken, or even deluded, but they’re not lying. Sounds reasonable — but I can’t let it stand. I think there are at least two reasons to resist this formulation.

The first reason has to do with the nature of their pronouncements. Kel Munger’s talk was on theories of the Apocalypse. The followers of apocalyptic personalities are told that the world is going to end. Everyone is going to die, except the Special Ones. A preacher describing the coming Apocalypse is not just expressing an opinion on scriptural eschatology, he is predicting a shattering end to human affairs. This prediction, if true, should prompt a drastic response from everyone who understands it. If we really think that the world as we have known it is going to end, we are going to start taking radical action. Wikipedia says that some of the Millerites gave away all their possessions. (It doesn’t mention the money and goods that were given to Miller himself; but preaching was his profession, so he was certainly paid something, which I guarantee you he accepted, even if he couldn’t possibly need it after October 22nd.) If you had an injury or a disease it would make perfect sense to put off any treatment. After all, you wouldn’t still have it in Heaven, right? The same reasoning applies to personal issues. If you’re having serious problems dealing with your husband, your job, or your alcoholism — none of that would be likely to still be bothering you after the Second Coming, so why worry? Because of this, the Millerites (and the victims of all other end-time prophecies) will be saddled with horrendous problems when the world doesn’t end. There will be all kinds of things they will wish they had attended to before it was too late.

A preacher who plans to risk getting his congregation into this kind of fix needs to be really sure that what he is saying is the truth. Would you get up on a stage and tell people about a major catastrophe, the kind that would require every sensible person to literally drop everything and literally run to the hills, taking nothing with them, if you were not pretty god-damned sure it was happening? That would be irresponsible, to say the least.

But what if you thought you could make a good living by delivering such speeches? I know: you still wouldn’t do it. Neither would I. But some people would.

Even if it’s true that he believes what is saying, he is saying something that should not be said without an extremely high level of confidence. And that, he does not have. Maybe he has gone through some sort of scriptural calculus to arrive at the predicted date. Maybe he’s thought about it a lot. Maybe he’s “prayed to God for guidance.” That’s not enough. To put the matter as generously as possible, he does not know what’s going to happen. He has a kind of feeling about it. He has no evidence. Maybe he say truthfully that he “firmly believes” the prophecy. But he cannot truthfully say that he knows. How would he know? — is there a way to check? Of course not. And if you can’t check, you don’t know.

“The world is about to end” is something you really shouldn’t say unless you know. That’s obvious — and therefore, to say such a thing is to promise that you do know. But you don’t know; so the promise is a lie.

~ • ~

Here is another reason that I hesitate to abandon my shocking accusation of lying on the part of apocalyptic preachers. I don’t think that ideas such as the Rapture can really be believed.

The Rapture is a belief that all ‘true Christians’ will be gathered together in the air to meet Christ at his return.

That’s how Wikipedia describes it. The exact formulation is not important. Note the word belief, which would be included in almost anyone’s definition. This is wrong. The Rapture is not a belief. It’s nonsense.

There’s a difference.

Atheists often accuse the “faithful” of having nonsensical beliefs. Sometimes the faithful agree! They’ll say things like, “I know it doesn’t make sense, but I believe it anyway.” For thousands of years, theologians have warned us that doctrines such as the Trinity cannot be understood by mere mortals. They use the word “mysteries” to make the concept more palatable, but it is garbage. You can’t believe something you don’t understand.

Tell me that the American River is 1,500 meters from here, and I might believe you. If you change your mind and say it’s 1,500 kilometers, I won’t. But if you say it’s 230 blivs from here, and also that you don’t know what a bliv is, I can’t have an opinion either way. I don’t agree or disagree — I don’t believe or disbelieve — I simply don’t know what you mean.

The same is true of “all true Christians will be gathered together in the air”. The problem with this statement is that it mixes categories (as does the simpler story of the resurrection of Jesus). What can it possibly mean for one person, or thousands, to float into the air?

Please don’t misunderstand me. I’m not saying that physically, scientifically, it’s impossible. My point is more subtle. I am saying that the story makes no sense. For thousands of human beings to float into the air to meet Jesus would require the suspension of thousands of well-known physical laws. Gravity, for example. And if you go high enough, you can’t breathe. So, yes, it’s impossible — but it’s much worse than that. As soon as the story tells us that all those laws are suspended, we don’t even know what the story is saying anymore.

Julia Sweeney has a great example in her show, Letting Go of God. Some Mormons are telling her about Heaven. She’s thinking: this is way too similar to Earth. You rejoin your whole family there? — who would want that? And then they say that your body is restored to perfect health, and she thinks, well, wait a minute — what if you had had a nose job, and you liked it? The Mormon picture of Heaven isn’t just ridiculous, it’s self-contradictory. It’s incoherent. It can’t be true that in Heaven everyone’s body is as good as new, and that it’s anything like the body each of us had when we were taken up; or that you have a physical body, and that you don’t age. It’s not just that it’s impossible: it makes no sense. So when people propose it, we literally don’t know what they mean.

And neither do they.

There is another example in a YouTube video by philhellenes, which I blogged about just a couple days ago. In Hell there’s supposed to be fire, which will burn you for all eternity. Now, the only kind of fire we know anything about works by burning fuel. If it burns for long enough, it will use up all the fuel and go out. But the fire in Hell doesn’t do this. Therefore, it’s not physical fire: it’s magic fire. But we don’t know anything about magic fire. Not one single thing. Apparently it is fundamentally different from physical fire, but in what way? — we don’t know. I say again: we know nothing about this magic fire. And therefore, when people tell us about it, we literally don’t know what they mean. And neither do they.

Hell, Heaven, the Rapture — no one knows the first thing about any of these things. But it’s worse than that. It’s not that there’s insufficient information, it’s that the only “information” we have contradicts itself. And a message that contradicts itself doesn’t say anything at all. “Heaven is in the sky” might make some kind of sense; “Heaven is not in the sky” also might. But “Heaven is in the sky and it is not in the sky” does not. Of course the way our minds work, we’ll automatically try very hard to make sense of it. Well, we reckon, it’s in the sky in a manner of speaking — and not in the sky in some other manner. But remember that we have no information on this. In what way might Heaven be in the sky, and in what other way might it not be? We know nothing whatsoever about Heaven. The raw contradictions are all we have.

So when someone says, “I believe in Heaven,” they can’t be right. There is no proposition there for them to believe. All we have about Heaven is nonsense, and nonsense is not a proposition, and if it’s not a proposition you can’t believe it. To believe is to have an opinion about a proposition. If it’s not a proposition, you can’t have an opinion about it. Just as you can’t lift something that’s not physical, you can’t believe something that’s not an idea.

Now someone might say, “You can lift something metaphorically — like, lifting someone’s spirits.” To which I would reply, “Well, do you really believe in God, or just metaphorically?”

~ • ~

Is it wrong to describe a priest who is preaching to his congregation as a liar? Really, I don’t think it’s too far off.

For one thing, he cannot possibly have the kind of confidence in his message that he should have, given the colossal ramifications of the message itself. At the very least, he has not done due diligence. He’s behaving recklessly. And through this reckless and irresponsible behavior, he’s making a living off the people who trust him. I’d call that lying, and I’d call it fraud.

For another thing, the idea that he believes what he is preaching is logically dubious. What he’s saying is utter nonsense, so I don’t think you can really say he believes it. The word ‘belief’ is inappropriate here. He’s not believing, only preaching. Maybe it would be wrong to characterize his sermons as lies, if he sincerely believed them — but he can’t believe them. No one can. They are not things that can be believed.

One last point.

If you prefer to think that he really believes these things, does that not make him dangerously delusional? If he really believes, for example, that the Earth is about to be destroyed and everyone will perish except very certain special folks, his intellectual and moral compasses are catastrophically skewed. Seriously, this person cannot be trusted to make important decisions for other people. Yet, he is counseling his flock on decisions of supreme importance! Whether to get married, and to whom. Whether to have children, or practice birth control. Who to save, and who to kill. What to spend their money on — all their money. He will tell them anything and everything, including real matters of life and death. These are not just opinions of the sort that everyone has and, like, “it’s a free country.” A church is not a free country. You don’t get to be a member of that church and do whatever you want. Many of the pastor’s pronouncements are not opinions but direct commands, and to disobey them is to cut yourself off from the rest of the congregation. You may be shunned, or ostracized — or much, much worse.

All day long this man tells his flock — his paying customers — things that are patently untrue. Is the spell he’s under really that strong? — or could this be all about his livelihood? Could he simply be making a living from lying? It’s not as if no one’s tried that before.

I love this video by Phil Hellenes, Why don’t scientists fear hell? It’s embedded below.

Here is a transcript of the crucial point. (This is heavily edited, but no words were changed or added. I hope I’ve retained the gist that Phil intended.)

Fire is a chemical reaction. When wood, for example, is heated to about 300 degrees Fahrenheit, the cellulose material starts to break down and give off volatile gases. When these gases reach about 500 degrees Fahrenheit, the heat energy overcomes some of the electromagnetic energy binding the atoms to the complex molecules found in wood. These briefly free atoms are then suddenly and violently drawn, by electromagnetism again, to combine with oxygen atoms. In the process, the atoms release energy – in the form of light. Fire is an electric phenomenon.

The heat you feel is the excited motions of the atoms in the air around you, and in your skin and flesh. Heat is simply the motion of atoms. In living tissue, when atoms jiggle too fast, they hit other atoms too hard, creating pressure that can damage cells, resulting in pain signals sent along nerves to your brain. If something hot burns you, some of your atoms simply jiggled too fast.

The actual understanding goes far, far deeper. But what does it all mean? It means that without atoms, and those subatomic particles and laws, there can be no flame. Rigid physical laws make fire possible. Anywhere there is fire, there will also be electricity, solid matter, and oxygen.

You’re not going to burn after you die. If we go anywhere after death, we go there without our atoms.

If someone tells you that you’re going to burn in Hell, and you demonstrate that you understand exactly what fire is, I guarantee that they will then tell you that fire in Hell is not like real fire. The flames need no fuel or oxygen or electrons or photons, but it burns just the same: jiggling atoms that aren’t there. In short, they’re telling you that the fire in Hell is magic fire.

But that doesn’t fly, does it? They can’t have it both ways. If it’s not real fire, why would it really burn you?

I’m not saying that a substitute can never have the same effect as the original. Fake sugar can be as sweet as real sugar, or even sweeter. But that’s because it tweaks the same tongue-molecules as sugar does. The experiential effect is the same because the physical cause is the same. In the Hell story we have no reason to believe that the cause is the same – in fact, we are specifically told that it is not the same. So there is no reason to believe that it would have the same effect.

Hellenes’ description here is compatible with my own view that most religious tenets are not just wrong but incoherent. This applies especially to the idea of miracles (and isn’t the pain of Hell-fire sort of a miracle in reverse?). A miracle is something that by definition, cannot happen, but we’re supposed to believe it anyway. I don’t think that such belief is even possible.

It’s everyone draw Muhammad day. Here’s mine. (Traced from a photograph of a different Muhammad.)

It just hit me. You know on those surveys? Where they ask people if they believe in God? If you pry a little you can find out exactly what the script is. And in the script it says, “Do you believe in God?” — with a capital G.

The infamous capital 'G'

Why?