Last year I heard some atheists say that Christians are more charitable than secularists. My gut told me that this could not be accurate, so I investigated. This investigation resulted in two blog posts: The Myth of Christian Charity, part 1 and part 2. After these were published, Gregory Paul alerted me to a book published in 2006, Who Really Cares, in which Arthur C. Brooks makes extremely strong claims about religion and generosity. Late in 2010 there appeared another book, Robert Putnam and David Campbell’s American Grace, which makes similar claims. I decided that, since the findings in these high-profile books were supposedly based on the statistical analysis of large-scale survey data—that is, they looked like science—they should be rebutted (if they are false) in the scientific literature. I did a ton of research, verified that they are false, and wrote a paper, which is now under review by a scientific journal. While we wait to hear about the paper, here is a layperson’s summary.
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Introduction
Religious representatives have always claimed that religion is a good thing, and that its many benefits include an improvement in morality. Religious people, they say, are kinder than the unchurched. Repetitions of this claim have embedded the phrase “Christian charity” in our language.
In recent years, professional scholars have reported finding empirical support for this traditional claim. Most prominent among these are Arthur C. Brooks (Who Really Cares? Who Gives, Who Doesn’t, and Why It Matters, 2006), and Robert Putnam and David Campbell (American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us, 2010). In this post I will call these three men “the traditionalists.”
“When it comes to charity,” says Brooks, “America is two nations—one charitable, the other uncharitable”; compared to the non-religious, “religious people are, inarguably, more charitable in every measurable way.” (Emphasis in the original.) Putnam and Campbell vigorously agree:
Some Americans are more generous than others. … In particular, religiously observant Americans are more generous with time and treasure than demographically secular Americans. … The pattern is so robust that evidence of it can be found in virtually every major national survey of American religious and social behavior. Any way you slice it, religious people are simply more generous.
This would be an astonishing result, a stunning vindication for advocates of religion everywhere, if it were valid. But it is not.
Methodological Challenges
The traditional hypothesis is that religiosity fosters generosity. To support this claim scientifically, we would have to (1) measure many people’s religiosity and generosity, (2) show that, on average, those people who have more of the former also have more of the latter, and (3) show that the former causes the latter. (The claim is that being religious makes people generous, rather than that being generous makes people religious, or that some third factor causes the first two.) The traditionalists fail to accomplish all three of these goals.
The business of sociology depends almost exclusively on surveys. Rather than observing people’s thoughts and feelings—which is impossible—the sociologist surveys them about their thoughts and feelings. Behavior, too, is generally inquired about rather than observed. But there is a problem: survey respondents tend to give answers that are flattering rather than true. This is called social desirability bias. In any community, behaviors considered good will be over-reported, and those considered bad will be under-reported. The problem is especially severe with behaviors to which strong norms are attached. Being generous and being religious are ideal exemplars of this category.
“Generosity can be measured most simply by measuring gifts of time and money,” write Putnam and Campbell. But surveys do not measure such gifts—they measure reports of such gifts. And these reports are anonymous, unverified, and subject to strong social pressures.
For a measure of religiosity, most surveys use frequency of church attendance. That one goes to services regularly is easy to say, hard to verify, and subject to strong community norms. In decades of surveys, 40 percent of Americans have reliably reported going to church pretty much every Sunday. It turns out that about half of them are liars. In the 90s, scientists found ways to count how many people were really attending. The number is much closer to 20 percent than to 40 percent. (See for example C. Kirk Hadaway and Penny Long Marler, “How Many Americans Attend Worship Each Week? An Alternative Approach to Measurement,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44(3):307-322 [2005].)
The traditionalists cite page after page of statistics showing a strong positive correlation between religiosity and generosity. But this tells us nothing of interest, because both attributes are likely to be over-reported, and in the case of generosity we don’t know by how much. Neither book mentions or addresses this enormous methodological problem.
In the measurement of generosity a more technical problem appears. Throughout both these books (and in the sociology-of-religion literature generally), the words generosity and charity are used interchangeably (as synonyms for altruism, benevolence, compassion, and so on). But charity has an additional sense. In the U.S. tax code, and in standard English, a charity is a nonprofit corporation; donations to such organizations are also called charity—a term easily confused with generosity.
Note, however, that generosity is not the same thing as donating to a nonprofit organization. These are different concepts. The first means, voluntarily helping others at some cost to oneself. The second means, giving money to an organization that qualifies as “not for profit” under the U.S. tax code.
Donations to one’s own church are tax-deductible. But that does not make them charitable, in the older sense of the word. They are membership dues for a social club. They do not benefit the wider community, as would, for example, donations to the Red Cross. They certainly should not be used as a proxy for the noble attribute we call generosity. Yet, this is exactly what Brooks and Putnam-and-Campbell do. In these books, the words charity and generosity are used to mean people’s (self-reported) charitable donations, including money given to their own church. Thus the measurement of generosity, which was already distorted by social desirability bias, is further distorted by a confusion of terminology.
Another technical issue relates to the measurement of religiosity. Is church attendance a good proxy by which to measure how religious people are? Perhaps not, if people report twice as much of it as they should. What else might we use? We could try frequency of prayer, or of Bible study, or how “certain” one is about the existence of God. And all these would be self-reports—but there is deeper problem here. How could we tell which of these things is more appropriate? In other words, what is religiosity?
Well, it is a matter of opinion. To verify this, notice that for any behavior (or attitude or quality) one party chooses as the epitome of religiosity, another party can say, “But that’s not really being religious,” and name some other behavior (or attitude or quality). There is no independent standard to which such claims be compared. If a man says, “I am highly religious,” nothing anyone else might say can prove him wrong. Even if they point out that he has previously described himself as an atheist, he can still say, for example, “I attend my wife’s church, and act as a deacon at the Sunday school”—or, “I have a very spiritual attitude toward life.” And no one can prove that these facts are less important to his religiosity than whether he professes to believe in God.
But if there is no evidence that can prove that a person is not religious, this means that we do not have a working definition of religiosity. And this means that the concept of religiosity is not useful in scientific research.
One finding is unimpeachable. People who go to church often give more money to churches than do people who go to church less often. But there is all the difference in the world between this finding and the claim that “Any way you slice it, religious people are simply more generous.”
Behavioral Observations
I mentioned that almost all sociological studies are based on data from surveys. There have been a few studies on religion and behavior where actual behavior was observed. (Brooks and Putnam-and-Campbell mention none of them.)
In the 1973 experiment of John M. Darley and C. Daniel Batson, the subjects (all students at Princeton Theological Seminary) “encountered a shabbily dressed person slumped by the side of the road.” Some were on their way to give a talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan; others had been assigned a topic unrelated to generosity. Those who (presumably) had generosity on their minds were not more likely than the others to stop and offer help to the slumped-over person. Also uncorrelated with their helping responses was their religiosity, as measured by a previous interview.
Some of the subjects were told, “Oh, you’re late. They were expecting you a few minutes ago. We’d better get moving.” This hurry condition had a significant effect on the subjects’ behavior. The authors conclude:
A person not in a hurry may stop and offer help to a person in distress. A person in a hurry is likely to keep going. Ironically, he is likely to keep going even if he is hurrying to speak on the parable of the Good Samaritan, thus inadvertently confirming the point of the parable. (Indeed, on several occasions, a seminary student going to give his talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan literally stepped over the victim as he hurried on his way!)
In a 1975 experiment by Ronald E. Smith, Gregory Wheeler, and Edward Diener, students in a large introductory psychology class were given an opportunity to cheat on a class test. On another, apparently unrelated occasion, they were asked to volunteer to help out some developmentally disabled children. Meanwhile, also seemingly unconnected with these events, a questionnaire was used to measure the strength of their religious affiliations. On the basis of this questionnaire, the subjects were divided into four groups: “Jesus people” (a term current in the 1970s, and not considered derogatory), religious, nonreligious, and atheists. No differences in either the rate of cheating or the rate of volunteering were observed between the four groups.
In another experiment (Lawrence V. Annis, Psychological Reports, 1976) subjects completed a questionnaire designed to measure “degree of commitment to traditional tenets of Western religion,” “location of religious values in the individual’s hierarchy of values,” and “frequency of religious behaviors like church attendance and private prayer.” Later, with no apparent connection to the questionnaire, each subject “happened” to see a woman carrying a ladder. The woman went into another room and closed the door; a few moments later there was an audible crash, designed to sound as if the woman had perhaps climbed the ladder and then fallen off. The subject then either opened the door or did not. None of Annis’s three measures of religious commitment bore any correlation with the likelihood of a subject’s opening the door.
Conclusion
Scientists who have taken the traditional hypothesis seriously and tested it experimentally have come up empty-handed. No evidence has been found for the proposition that religiosity fosters generosity. And that is not surprising, when we consider that no one even knows what religiosity is. People who describe themselves as religious tend also to describe themselves as generous. But this relation does not obtain in their actual behavior toward other human beings.
When people cite these studies about religion and generosity, they are usually doing it with the end of convincing people to convert to religion (hopefully theirs). Because this is a common goal of these discussions, it seems like it would be better to set up a study that side-steps altogether the problem of the definition of “religious,” by comparing generosity rates before and after conversion.
People self-identify as religious or not, even though we know that everyone has a different definition of what that means to them. So that’s an intractible problem. But people seem to be claiming that that self-identity is what’s causing the increase in generosity, so maybe we should address that directly. So maybe we could develop a study (or find an already existing one?) that looks at, for example, people who used to identify with a religion and later converted to atheism or agnosticism, or people who went the other way— from atheism into a religion. We still have the problem with self-reporting, so this would be tricky, but it would address the question more directly.
We could also use statistical data to compare overall levels of donations to non-profits (churches not included, for the obvious reasons mentioned in the article) with poll levels of religious unaffiliation, i.e. “nones” (which has risen sharply in recent decades.) You’d have to correct for the failing economy, but I imagine you could debunk the generosity myth with reasonable certainty this way.
[…] Godinu dana kasnije, Lorens Anis (Lawrence V. Annis), profesor psihologije na Univerzitetu u Misisipiju, izveo je sličan, jednako zanimljiv eksperiment, čiji su rezultati pokazali da religioznost ne utiče na spremnost da se pomogne neznancu. […]
[…] his money to that club. For example, a sports club, etc. Should we call that charity? The writer at Yashwata.info doesn’t think […]
[…] they are asking is whether religion makes people more generous. The answer is complicated and much debated. Religious people make more tax deductible donations, but without controlled research it has been […]
Yes, this is tricky. I am struggling with how to think about it.
In the Afghanistan story I used the word “religion” to refer to a vast, complex social order, not all of which is connected with the practice of Islam. Maybe that was sloppy. It’s probably sloppy to talk about the effects of religion, because that word could mean almost anything.
The moral of the Afghanistan story is that when people make decisions based on something they call “religion,” outcomes are typically regrettable.
My paper is about the putative effects of religiosity. In my opinion, the bottom line is that religiosity has no effects because it does not exist. The bedrock meaning of “religiosity” is belief in God. (Researchers use proxy measures, because they can’t measure belief itself.) But no one has such a belief.
On the one hand you say that religion is an incoherent category and that no-one knows what religiosity is. On the other hand you seem quite happy to suggest that some Afghan men rape boys because of religion (https://yashwata.info/2010/09/01/everybody-loses/). So which is it? Are we entitled to talk about the effects of religion, or are we not?
This is a good question. Before answering it, let me first agree with your next sentence:
If you could show that regular prayer makes people more generous, that would be interesting. But you’d have to tell me more about what you mean by “prayer.” And then you’d want to compare this prayer-activity to something that’s like prayer but without the religious component. Because maybe that would make people even more generous. And then we would have to say, Oh! It isn’t prayer per se that made those folks generous, it was this other thing we invented.
At this point, some people would say, “But that’s real prayer.” — What, the kind from which we removed the religious language? “Yes, because religion transcends language.” And the fact that we could have this argument means that the category of religion is not just “slippery,” it is incoherent.
I would say it’s not necessarily the religious component that is important. It could be the friendly social togetherness that’s doing the work. Furthermore, the causation could be going the other way: perhaps generous people are more likely to attend religious services than selfish people are. This would explain the correlation just as well.
Yes, one could say that. But first, we’d have to talk about what it means to show that a given subject “believes in God.”
This statement assumes the existence of some definition of religion that we can hold fixed while we talk about its effects. This is just what sociology of religion lacks.
That playing squash improves fitness is a perfectly sensible claim. (Of course there might be other sports that improve fitness more. It’s not as if there is some essential squashiness that’s good for your health.) But the important difference between squash and religion is that it’s easy to tell whether or not someone is playing squash.
Imagine that it was claimed that religion improves fitness. The first question would be, “What do you mean by religion?” (The second would be, “What is the mechanism?”)
Most of the studies I am critiquing try to identify something called “religiosity” and correlate it with something called “generosity.” But no one knows what religiosity is. Imagine that a group of researchers were studying what happens to people who spend all their time in casinos, and the researchers described this activity as “the love of gambling.” Sociology of religion is like this — only much worse.
The real explanation of most of the results showing a correlation between “religiosity” and “generosity” is very simple. When people give money to their churches it is mistakenly called “charity.” What the data show is that people who belong to expensive clubs are more likely to spend their money on club dues than people who don’t belong.
Let me try to answer your question from way back. What would I credit as a positive effect of religion? Imagine that we could devise a way to measure the sincerity and intensity of people’s beliefs. We could then define as “religious” those people who sincerely and intensely believe that after they die they will be happy in Heaven for all eternity. And now imagine that it were shown that such people tend to be kinder (in their day-to-day behavior toward others) than those without such beliefs. We would then have to admit that such beliefs, though they are irrational, can at times have positive social effects. (Of course nothing like this has ever happened.)
Well, if they didn’t test their subjects for religiosity then this study is not relevant to the discussion and I’m sorry I brought it up. Evolved surveillance-detection mechanisms may have something to do with superstition, but not with religion. No scholars are claiming that superstition makes people more generous — I hope.
Roy, thanks for your response. I agree that there are many unknowns where these priming studies are concerned. But to consider your Jesus/classroom example, my question is this: What would you regard as a positive effect of religion? As you note in your post, religion is a slippery category, encompassing a range of beliefs and behaviours (including prayer, attendance at religious services and ceremonies, the studying of religious texts, and beliefs in a god or gods). If I demonstrate that attending religious services makes people (causes people) to be more generous, you might say “Well that’s not a positive effect of religion, it’s the communal service that’s doing the work. Maybe some other kind of communal service would be more effective”. If I demonstrate that belief in God causes people to be more honest, you might say “well that’s not a positive effect of religion, it’s the belief in a supernatural watcher that’s having the effect. Maybe some other kind of supernatural agent belief (ghosts, witches, the tooth fairy) would be more effective.” This is all fine, so long as you don’t also want to blame religion for anything. If there is no conceivable circumstance that can demonstrate that religion has positive effects, then you must allow that no conceivable circumstance could show that religion has negative effects.
(As an aside, if I said “Playing squash improves fitness” would you say “no it doesn’t, it’s the cardiovascular activity that’s doing the work. Some other kind of cardiovascular activity might be more effective” ?)
The “pair of eyes” study you mentioned was conducted by Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006). It was a field study and they didn’t measure religious belief. You say that this manipulation “has to do with religion only if you assume that religion has something to do with making people honest — which begs the question.” I don’t see why it’s question-begging to consider the relationship of this effect to religion. If religious primes increase prosocial behavior, one possibility is that they do this by serving as input for evolved surveillance-detection mechanisms. In other words, they may activate the notion that you are being watched. The eye image may also function as input to the same mechanism. So here is a clear and plausible connection between religion and the eye images, but there’s nothing question-begging about it.
Best wishes,
Ryan.
Reference:
Bateson, M., Nettle, D., and Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters, 2, 412-414.
Ryan, thanks very much for the references. I have read two (or three) of these papers; I will look up the other two (or one). The paper I submitted does not cite them because I’m not sure what exactly the relationship is between priming and religiosity. (Nor do I think anyone else is sure.) Manipulating the salience of religious concepts is not the same thing as manipulating the subjects’ religiosity. Malhotra’s “Sunday effect” is fascinating — but is it an instance of religiosity making people generous?
If putting a picture of Jesus in every classroom made students better learners, would we properly regard that as a positive effect of religion? No. We would then have to ask: what is it about this poster that makes students learn more? Can the effect be intensified? Maybe a picture of Einstein would be twice as effective.
In one study (I don’t remember if it was among the four you’ve mentioned), there was this big pair of eyes on the wall, and it made people more honest. But a pair of eyes is not a religious symbol. Such a manipulation has to do with religion only if you assume that religion has something to do with making people honest — which begs the question. (Furthermore, if I remember correctly, it made non-believers more honest too.)
So I’m still thinking about these studies and haven’t decided what their significance is. However, they were mentioned by one of my reviewers, so I need to make a decision soon.
Thanks for the interesting post. However, you have neglected a recent strand of research that uses priming methodologies to get at the causality issue. As you correctly point out, self-reports and surveys are susceptible to social desirability. Behavioural studies, on the other hand, tend to be correlational. Conclusions about causality require that religion be manipulated rather than merely measured, and this is where priming paradigms are useful, as they may enable researchers to effectively assign religion to participants in the lab.
Recent experimental studies indicate that religious primes promote generosity (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), charitable intentions (Pichon, Boccato & Saroglou, 2007; Malhotra, 2010), and honesty (Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007). It’s certainly legitimate to criticise the methodology of these studies and to dispute their conclusions, but I’m surprised that you have ignored them altogether.
References:
Malhotra, D. (2010). (When) are religious people nicer? Religious salience and the “Sunday Effect” on pro-social behavior. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(2), 138–143.
Pichon, I., Boccato, G. & Saroglou, V. (2007). Nonconscious influences of religion on prosociality: A priming study. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol., 37, 1032–1045.
Randolph-Seng, B. & Nielsen, M. E. (2007). Honesty: One effect of primed religious representations. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 17, 303-315.
Shariff, A. F. & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you: Priming God concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Psychological Science, 18, 803-809.
I adopted no such premise.
The average church in the United States devotes less than 4% of its income to humanitarian projects. I reckon the Red Cross does much better than that.
Begging the question. Assuming the conclusion. Circular reasoning. This is exactly where the problem lies.
I just came across a review of Putnam and Campbell’s book and had the same misgivings you did hence ;landed on your page. I do not agree with your premise that a “ton” of research on your part can prove the authors wrong. Nor can three experiments from behavioral science necessarily bring the matter to a close. By the way, I have heard preachers use those experiments in their sermons to bring clarity to the problem — something that is lost in the tone of your critique.
I am an economist and know there are many similar statistical problems analyzing contributions to secular non-profits like the Red Cross. The American Red Cross, for example, has a notoriously high overhead. Is it as high as most churches and synagogues? You’d have to do a careful study of their payrolls and expenditures to find what percentage actually goes to the recipient. But there is something totally missing in your analysis. “Generosity” has a personal and moral dimension. Churches and synagogues and mosques emphasize the importance of faith and works through a personal experience of.community. This can be done by secular institutions, but I would argue that the verdict is out on which basis leads to a better society.
I saw the other day a posting from someone taking issue with statistics that show the United States gives more international assistance through private non-profits (as a percentage of GDP) than some of the most generous nations in the OECD. Hr pointed out in his critique that many of those charitable U.S. donations go from rich people to pet causes. Is Norway or Sweden more generous that the United States because it taxes its people and sets up a well paid government proxy to pass donations? Perhaps it is more transparent than private philanthropy, but is it really more generous in the moral sense? And then there is the question of how much Norway and Sweden are freeloading on American defense expenditure, not to mention the loss of blood in the defense of freedom. How does that factor into our generosity? And where would the world be without the religious? I think the experiments with other forms of tyranny have proven the point.
I am reminded of a story (perhaps apocryphal) concerning the pastor to the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York. One day at a cocktail party an agnostic or atheist interlocutor quipped at him: “I’d love to attend church, but I’ve found it’s full of hypocrites.” The good pastor replied: “Well drop in. There’s room for one more.”
I’m replying to Rob’s comment. I would like proof of the story.
I’m not sure I believe this story. Do you have some documentation? And even if it were true, it would not alter the point of my article.
Look at what you wrote at the end, implying that “an out-pouring of love by … atheists” is implausible. That is an assumption, and it is biasing your thinking. That is the point of my article.
Dennis, are you commenting on the blog post or replying to Rob’s comment?
Do you have evidence to prove this?
A few years ago David Platt, pastor of the Church at Brook Hills in Birmingham, Alabama went to the local foster care office and asked how many families they would need to provide a home for every child in need of one. They said 150. The next Sunday he preached a message on the Christian calling to care for orphans from James 1 and at the end of the service 150 families committed to fostering kids. When was the last time you were at an atheist get-together and someone suggested something like that? Followed by an out-pouring of love by those atheists?